University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Geography Scholarship

Geography

2000

Apprenticeship and Conservation Incentives
Robin Alden
Maine Center for Coastal Fisheries

Jennifer F. Brewer
University of New Hampshire, Durham, jennifer.brewer@unh.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/geog_facpub
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Community-Based Learning Commons,
Environmental Policy Commons, Nature and Society Relations Commons, Place and Environment
Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations Commons

Recommended Citation
Alden, R. and J.F. Brewer. 2000. Apprenticeship and Conservation Incentives, 8 pp. In Microbehavior and
Macroresults: Proceedings of the International Institute for Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 10-14,
Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon.

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Geography at University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Geography Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact
Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

IIFET 2000 Proceedings

Apprenticeship and Conservation Incentives
Presented at International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade IIFET 2000
Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR
July 12, 2000
Robin Alden, Stonington Fisheries Alliance, Stonington, Maine
Jennifer F. Brewer, Graduate School of Geography, Clark University and School of Marine Sciences, University of Maine
Abstract. Apprentice programs offer a method to encourage responsible individual behavior by laying the foundation for
successful collective property rights. Apprenticeship has three purposes: to restrict the rate of entry, to affect the quality of
the participant, and to create the conditions for collective action for sustainability. Apprenticeship could be an important
fishery management tool, particularly in decentralized, adaptive management regimes that require ongoing, multi-party
negotiation for success. It is not vocational training; instead it serves a public purpose: to create the conditions for
stewardship and participation in management. This perception of collective property right mimics customary practice in some
successful traditional fisheries such as the Maine lobster fishery where customary practice has been demonstrated both to
have conservation benefits and to lower enforcement costs. Case information from Maine's new, statutory lobster apprentice
program is discussed. Apprenticeship creates conditions for responsible behavior by creating a stable population that can
develop long term assurances about expected behavior and can develop credible internal monitoring and sanctions. In
addition to requiring a personal investment of time, it provides information about fishing ethics and non-fishing information
about basic biology, ecology, and participation in the management system. This, because it changes the frame of reference,
should affect individual behavior both fishing and as participants in management. Apprenticeship focuses on the individual
fishing as the principal actor in conservation. The apprenticeship approach bolsters both co-management and, for that matter,
conventional limited entry programs as well.
Keywords: Apprenticeship, entry controls, lobster, co-management, conservation, property rights
1.

INTRODUCTION

No longer is it possible to assert that merely controlling
fishing mortality or the number of participants will sustain
the world's fisheries. Thus fishery management cannot
avoid rules that are integrally tied to the specifics of the
fishery in question: how, when, and where fish are caught
and how this fits with the ecosystem. Faced with this
added complexity, apprenticeship can make a major
contribution to establishing the context for effective group
consensus to solve the problem of mutual restraint in a
world difficult to control from shore.
The National Research Council's Sustaining Marine
Fisheries (National Research Council 1998) concludes
that a broader approach to fishery management is
necessary: something broader than controlling fishing
mortality rate through single species management. It calls
for management that is ecosystem-based. It also called
for developing and encouraging socioeconomic and other
management incentives that discourage overcapacity and
that reward conservative and efficient use of marine
resources and their ecosystems. (p. 7)
The same year, in its Report to Congress, the Ecosystems
Principles Advisory Panel (National Marine Fisheries
Service 1998) recommends that fishery management
councils create Fishery Ecosystem Plans. The panel

included consideration of such factors as the limited
ability to predict ecosystem behavior, the importance of
diversity, the fact that factors occurring on multiple scales
are important, and consideration of flows of materials and
information in complex patterns. One of the panel's five
management policies, designed to facilitate the more
complex management that ecosystem-based management
represents, is to make local incentives compatible with
global goals.
Decentralization of management and development of
systems that are accountable and able to adapt is a
response to this greater complexity. It is in this context
that apprenticeship should be considered as a
management measure.
Apprenticeship has three purposes: to restrict the rate of
entry, to affect the quality of the participant, and to create
the conditions for collective action for sustainability.
2.

DEFINITION OF APPRENTICESHIP

The concept of apprenticeship can be broadly defined to
include any training or fishery enhancement work
required as a specific condition of participation in a
fishery. Apprenticeship is a concept that is widely used in
Europe outside the fisheries context and is used to a lesser
degree in trades and professions in the US. With the
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Apprenticeship differs from many forms of entry
restriction because it is focused on the individual, and
more specifically, on the individual who is fishing. Once
again, the concept is a broad one and could be
administered within a licensing system that gives permits
to vessels or owners rather than on-board fishermen. In
the latter case, the practical questions will be whether to
require training and time invested of the owner or of the
actual employee fisherman.
The benefits of
apprenticeship will be the most direct in true
owner/operator situations where the actual fisherman is
the person both licensed and accountable on the water.

exception of Iceland (Palsson 1994), some countries that
require some form of safety or seamanship training, and
some traditional societies (Ruddle 1994), apprenticeship
is not widely documented as a form of entry restriction in
fisheries. The safety and seamanship training is required
for a public purpose (safety) that is separate from the
conservation and economic efficiency purposes of most
fishery management so the safety training programs have
not been given serious scrutiny in the fishery management
context.
Apprenticeship is not vocational training; it is training to
fulfill a public purpose.
The stated reason that
hairdressers, plumbers, and medical doctors are required
to meet licensing standards is to ensure public safety as
well as to control entry and bolster wages. For fishing,
the public purpose of apprenticeship, in addition to
regulation of the rate of entry, is to facilitate sustainable
use of the fishery by creating a common knowledge base
and quality of participants, a compelling rationale when
compared to some of the other trades.

3. MAINE LOBSTER FISHERY
Maine’s lobster industry is a trap-only fishery comprised
of vessels about 25-40 feet in length. All boat captains are
owner-operators and most employ one crew member,
called a sternman.
In 1995, groundbreaking lobster legislation passed the
Maine Legislature. The new law required that any new
lobster fisherman be required to put in two years practical
experience prior to obtaining a commercial lobster and
crab fishing license. The law also enabled but did not
require the Maine Department of Marine Resources to
require educational courses. The law was passed as an
alternative to an actual limited entry program that
controlled the total number of participants in the fishery.

Apprenticeship is a form of entry restriction (Townsend
1990). While most entry restriction regimes focus on
achieving the correct number of participants,
apprenticeship does not directly restrict the number of
participants. Instead, it controls both the rate of entry into
a fishery and the quality of the participants. It can be
applied as an additional barrier to entry in fisheries where
there is limited entry with transferable or non-transferable
licenses or where entry is determined by a lottery or
waiting list. It can also be used as a substitute for other
forms of entry restriction.

The legislation also established seven Lobster
Management Zones and a democratically-elected
governance structure that involved Lobster Management
Policy Councils (called lobster zone councils) and
referendum decision-making by lobstermen on three
topics: the trap limit below the state cap (now 800), the
time fished, and the numbers of traps fished on a trawl.

True apprenticeship is a form of entry restriction that
applies only to commercial users. Nonetheless, it is not
inconceivable, (though highly unlikely in the politicized
world of recreational saltwater fishing licensing) that the
idea of training requirements could be extended to certain
recreational fisheries. Hunter safety courses are a
standard requirement in many states for obtaining a
recreational hunting license.

It is too early for a meaningful evaluation of the program
and to date, none has been attempted. During the five
years since implementation, a predictable array of
practical and political events has occurred so that to date,
there is no clear track record for the apprenticeship as a
form of entry restriction. During the first year, the Maine
Department of Marine Resources undertook the massive
effort of qualifying the existing 7000 lobstermen. As a
result of the political outcry from people who were
excluded from the fishery as a result of that process, the
Legislature eased up on restrictions the next year,
allowing additional entry from people with only minor
history in the fishery. At the same time, the trap limit and
the predictable human reaction of wanting to fish up to
the new limit, caused an escalation of traps by those who
had previously fished only lightly. These two factors
caused established lobstermen to perceive a huge influx of
entry. This resulted in the successful campaign to get a

An apprenticeship can simply require on-the-boat
training, which fulfills vocational training and the entry
restriction functions. However, to fully serve a public
purpose of promoting stewardship, an apprenticeship
should also include non-fishing content that a fisherman
needs to be a responsible resource user and participant in
co-management. This information includes biology and
ecology, rules and ethics, information about the
regulatory arena and how to participate in that arena
effectively. Apprenticeship can also include donation of
"conservation time," some kind of work requirement for
stock enhancement or stewardship as is frequently done in
intertidal clam fisheries.

2
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a distinct community, an institutional arrangement that
has proven successful in numerous cases. (Wade 1994,
Berkes 1985, Hanna 1990, Eggertson 1993, Feeney et al 1996, McKay and Acheson 1987)

two-year moratorium on entry passed in 1998. At the
same time, an owner/operator provision was passed,
codifying what is the standard practice in the fishery.
The two-year practical experience requirement has been
defined by regulation as a minimum of 200 days over a
minimum of two years. An apprentice must have a daily
log signed by his/her captain and countersigned every 50
days by the local Maine Marine Patrol officer. Some
lobstermen are willing to let any sternman be an
apprentice under them. Others are extremely choosy and
might, for example, only allow a nephew or son the
privilege. Some members of the industry have suggested
that a letter should go out to all apprentice sponsors,
laying out the responsibility that sponsoring someone
entails.

No longer can we assume that users of the resource are
unboundedly rational, maximizers of individual utility.
Instead, it is more appropriate to assume that users are
constrained by norms, imperfect information, sub-optimal
equilibria, path dependencies, and contradictory goals,
and that they are capable of cooperation under certain
conditions (Simon 1954, 1987, North 1990, Sugiden
1990, Taylor 1990, Conlisk 1996, Ostrom 1999).
Our view of fishery resources has changed as more has
been learned about the complexity of their biology and
oceanography. Fisheries can no longer be considered
homogeneous across their range. Ecosystem, rather than
single species management is recommended, albeit not
yet developed. (National Marine Fisheries Service 1998,
National Research Council 1998) Control of fishing
mortality while still important, is not enough (Wilson et al
1994).

Maine does not require any educational courses as part of
the two-year lobster apprenticeship.
The law is
permissive, however, and we have collected information
from the industry about their preferences for courses,
should they be required.
Virtually universally,
lobstermen wanted courses to be limited to things that
served the public purpose: either conservation or safety.
Topics that received support for inclusion in an
educational offering included basic lobster biology and
ecology, local fishing ethics, rules and regulations and
their purpose, the structure of the fishery management
agencies, and how to participate in management at
various levels.
Lobstermen did not support any
vocational training beyond what would be taking place in
the 200 days on the boat.
3.

The role of uncertainty in science, in policymaking, and
in the information that harvesters use must now be
acknowledged in the development of both theory and
policy. (Ludwig 1993, Holling 1978) The theory of
complex adaptive systems (Holland 1998) offers more
effective guidance to a policy maker than a deterministic
view of fisheries.
In an effort to control fishing mortality, fishery policy has
focused on limiting access, and/or privatizing resources
through measures such as individual transferable quotas
(ITQs). Conventional approaches to limited access do not
attempt to directly resolve the conflict between the
individual and social incentives (Wilson 1994). And, in
fact, neither conventional limited entry nor individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) have produced reliable
conservation outcomes. (Copes 1986, Townsend, 1990)
Townsend's (1990) evaluation of many limited entry
fisheries demonstrates that limited entry has neither
reliably eliminated capital stuffing nor obviated the need
for an escalating set of direct input and output controls in
order to achieve necessary conservation. The shift from
common property to exclusive access rights, in many
resource contexts, has, at times, exacerbated the
conservation problem (Ciriacy and Wantrup 1975, Blaikie
& Brookfield 1987, Schmink & Wood 1987, Van Ginkel
1988, Hanna 1990) Furthermore, in fisheries with ITQs
privatizing the rights to the fish stock have not eliminated
enforcement problems. (Townsend 1990).

CONTEXT

Current fishery managers face a highly confusing
situation.
Assumptions underlying conventional
management policy have changed, and many commonlyused management tools have proven to be unreliable in
creating stewardship and conservative behavior.
The basic assumptions underlying discussions about the
common pool dilemma have changed dramatically in the
thirty years since Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the
Commons." (Hardin 1968) This does not change the
challenge of managing a common pool resource,
articulated by Hardin as, "mutual coercion, mutually
agreed upon." It does, however, change the context in
which policy is made.
A distinction has been drawn between open access
resources, common property resources, and privatized
resources. Hardin's tragedy was one that comes from
open access, where no one owns a resource (CiriacyWantrup and Bishop 1975). Common property resources
are those where access and terms of use are controlled by

Decentralized management that is community-based,
adaptive and capable of learning is emerging as an
approach that offers promise in dealing with this
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complexity. It is in this context, where fishermen and
managers will be obliged to successfully negotiate the
terms of fishery management, that apprenticeship can
make a major contribution. The role of fishery manager
has changed. Formerly, a fishery manager was someone
who must arrive, through rational analysis, at the
appropriate quota and then impose and enforce it from the
top, through bureaucratic authority. Now a manager must
try to develop collective institutions within the fishery
that can result in conservative behavior by those
individuals involved in use of the resource.

different from the purely financial investment required for
the purchase of a transferable license or quota. An
investment in a license or quota must be capitalized,
which requires an entrant to borrow money and start large
to pay the entry fee. This sets up an incentive that
directly opposes the conservation intent. In contrast,
apprenticeship requires the investment of time and
attention on the job, something that a young person from
a fishing community can give without having to borrow.
It enables a new entrant to start small, build sweat equity,
and retain the ability to adapt (by not fishing) to changing
resource conditions.

5. PURPOSE OF APPRENTICESHIP

Apprenticeship can provide greater flexibility in
controlling the rate of entry, compared to most
conventional entry restriction mechanisms that rely on
fixed numerical thresholds. It is not legal in most states to
use educational requirements solely as entrance barriers to
a trade or profession. However, particularly when fishing
apprenticeship is in its infancy, it is possible to affect the
rate of entry by varying parameters such as the time span
of an existing apprenticeship program or the rigor of
training and evaluation procedures. This provides the
policy maker with a tool that has fewer of the political
and legal hurdles that pertain in more direct and absolute
changes in license availability or ownership rights.

It is particularly important to look at apprenticeship in
light of the trend toward decentralized management.
Apprenticeship directly, rather than indirectly, addresses
the need to stimulate stewardship in a fishery in order to
achieve conservation goals. Apprenticeship operates in
three ways: Restricts the rate of entry, establishes an
environment where stewardship is part of the culture of a
fishery; and provides the tools that make stewardship
possible.
Apprenticeship can contribute to creating effective
collective property rights and aligning individual actions
and interests with the common good. It can contribute to
creating the conditions for stewardship and enabling
collective action to solve the problem of mutual restraint.
Apprenticeship addresses a number of the conditions that
both Ostrom (1990, 1999) and Pinkerton and Weinstein
(1995) list as characteristic of successful resource
management regimes including group boundaries,
accountability, effective management/locally appropriate
rules, accountable monitoring and effective sanctions,
good public discussion, adequate conflict resolution in
fishing and in rulemaking, and adaptiveness and ability to
learn.

In Maine, the apprenticeship law provides a formal,
institutionalized imitation of a social practice that had
existed in the fishery previously. Entry into lobstering in
a given area has always been contingent to some degree
on acceptance by those fishermen fishing the same area.
(Acheson 1988) However, prior to the passage of the
lobster apprenticeship law, the fishery experienced a
period of unprecedented growth. High lobster abundance
and changes in technology made lobstering easier to
succeed at and these factors eroded the traditional barriers
to entry that functioned through lobster clusters and a
complex social structure that regulated who fished, where,
and with what standards. (Acheson 1988, 2000, Acheson
and Brewer 2000) Many of the new entrants did not have
the experience in the mores of lobstering, and contributed
to a rapid escalation of effort.

5.1 Restrict rate of entry
Apprenticeship requires a future entrant to invest of his or
her own time and attention in the fishery. Depending on
the length of time and degree of attention required,
apprenticeship can greatly reduce opportunistic entry.
Apprenticeship requires that someone desiring to enter a
fishery make a deliberate decision to do so and commit
time and work to becoming eligible, work that precludes
other opportunities in the mean time. This makes it
impossible, for example, for someone to quickly invest in
gear and/or boat to take advantage of a recently
discovered concentration of product in a fishery.

Only two years' data exists for apprentice licenses in
Maine (Table 1.) The number of apprentices in 1999
increased 118% over 1998 largely due to a change in the
law that required student licensees to participate in the
formal apprenticeship program. However, relative to the
total number of licenses, the percentage of apprentices
remains low: 3.4% in 1998 and 8.1% in 1999. Even in
1999, there are fewer than half as many apprentices as
there are fishermen age 61 and older. These numbers are
a good indicator of the change that apprenticeship has
created in the fishery. Previously, holding a lobster
license was a basic matter of identity for members of
coastal communities, whether or not they actively fished,

The barrier to entry that apprenticeship represents, while
translatable to cost or investment, is substantively
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within which trust and negotiation can take place. It
provides information to create a common pool of
knowledge, expectations, and ethics for participants in a
fishery, thereby changing both values and behavior. And
it provides orientation to the participatory arena within
which all fishermen involved in decentralized
management must operate.

and as lobster abundance and technology changed, this
increasingly included wage earners and retired people as
well as members of traditional fishing families. This
provided a huge pool of potential fishermen who were
available to enter opportunistically when conditions either
in the fishery or in the rest of the coastal economy
warranted. Formalized apprenticeship now appears to
have virtually eliminated this type of entrant.

1997
1998
1999

Lobster
licenses

Apprentices

Licensees
>60

6406
6321
5989

NA
217
487

NA
NA
1063

Apprenticeship creates a stable population of participants.
Because of the time required to fulfill the requirements,
the individuals in an apprenticeship fishery are relatively
stable and predictable when compared to a system without
apprenticeship and with license transferability. This
facilitates the creation of group boundaries and the
elimination of free riders, allowing discount rates to
remain low and institution building to occur. It creates a
situation where participants in the fishery can establish
long term assurances about the expected behavior of other
participants, a necessary condition for mutual restraint
(Ostrom, 1990, Wilson 1994). This is not possible in a
situation
with
license
transferability
without
apprenticeship.

Table 1. Maine lobster licenses
5.2 Affect quality of participant
Whereas most entry restrictions control the number of
participants, apprenticeship directly addresses the quality
and training of new entrants.

Apprenticeship can facilitate development of effective
internal monitoring and sanctions, thereby improving
voluntary compliance with rules. Effective sanctions are
essential for effective management.
Because it is
unrealistic to expect the force of law to be effective
enough on the water to provide adequate external
deterrence, voluntary compliance is not only the most
cost-effective option, it is essential. (Ostrom 1990,
Sutinen et al 1990)

It is important to note that apprenticeship differs from
many management tools in that it recognizes the unique
status of the individual working fisherman in the
conservation equation. Apprenticeship operates at the
level of the individual fisherman: the person who is
actually onboard, interacting directly with the resource,
rather than on owners or vessels. This fact gives
apprenticeship tremendous power because conservation
actually takes place on the boat, not in the boardroom.
Fishing takes place out of sight of the general public and
far beyond the effective reach of most enforcement
authorities. Detection of rule violations by authorities is
very difficult, so that the peer pressure and individual
values are important deterrents to illegal activity. This
means that the norms of those actually doing the fishing,
those being addressed directly by apprenticeship, are far
more important to conservation than they would be in a
more controllable situation.

The benefits of group formation and effective sanctions
operate both with respect to externally derived rules and
in the often invisible internal structure of a fishery. In
every fishery there are fishing practices that are
commonly accepted.
Acceptable practices involve
appropriate and inappropriate ways of sharing
information, standards for showing respect to or handling
conflict with other fishermen fishing in the same area, and
insuring against unsafe practices. In a fixed gear fishery
such as a demersal or pelagic longline fishery or the
Maine lobster fishery acceptable practices include such
things as how to set trawls relative to other fishermen's
gear or relative to the tide. They also include a number of
informal common courtesy practices that vary from area
to area. In a mobile gear fishery they include procedures
for lining up to share a tow, a specific path where towing
is possible on hard bottom. These are externalities that
require continuous negotiation and cooperation to operate
well. Fishermen who disregard these informal rules
reduce the efficiency of responsible fishermen and
degrade the fishery. If the violators cannot be controlled,
behavior sinks to the lowest common denominator, as
responsible fishermen are forced to respond in kind in
order to compete. Apprenticeship can establish the

Apprenticeship places an explicit focus on the individual
responsibility that a fisherman has both in fishing and in
participating as someone who holds responsibility in a
decentralized management system.
5.3 Create conditions
sustainability

for

collective

action

for

Apprenticeship can facilitate creation of the conditions
necessary for effective collective action for sustainability.
It contributes to group definition, creating boundaries
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A good apprentice program also provides information
about rules, management agencies, and processes as well
as skills necessary for effective participation in
management. These include such skills as conflict
resolution and meeting protocols. A byproduct of the
skill acquisition should be added confidence and more
effective participation.

conditions where such negotiation, cooperation, and
conflict resolution can function effectively.
The information dissemination that occurs during an
apprenticeship also contributes to group formation and
effective sanctions. Two types of information are
transmitted: ethics and standard practices that obtain in
the fishery and non-fishing information about biology,
ecology, rules, and process. This occurs in the on-theboat work requirement and in the coursework.

Decentralized management makes the acquisition of both
the scientific and the participatory skills particularly
important.
Co-management or community based
management requires discussion and negotiation among
diverse groups: other fishermen, managers, scientists, and
the general public. This is what Dietz and Stern (1998)
call analytic deliberation. The common knowledge base
will strengthen the group formation within the fishery and
may facilitate their arriving at consensus. Both the skills
and the knowledge will help the multi-party deliberation
process to integrate scientific analysis and deliberation
and manage conflict.

Traditionally, ethics and standard practices in fisheries
have been transmitted through on-the-job training. The
results of this are uneven and dependent on the degree of
teaching done by the captain and his/her standards.
In the Maine lobster fishery, apprenticeship mimics a
traditional practice at a time when those traditions are
changing. The state of Maine issues lobstering licenses
that ostensibly allow licensees to set their traps anywhere
in state waters. In practice, however, entry into the
fishery, and the spatial area available to the setting of
traps, are controlled by harbor-based groups of fishermen.
The membership of each harbor group is comprised of
persons residing nearby, many of whom come from
fishing families. Relative outsiders who enter the fishery
directly, without serving as a sternman in the area, are
usually able to gain fishing privileges only after enduring
a couple years of hazing. They usually suffer losses of
capital and labor in the form of molestation and damage
of fishing gear and other property, as well as shunning or
direct verbal communications. These practices have
diminished somewhat in recent years, however,
undermined by unprecedented lobster abundance,
technological and socioeconomic changes, and increased
state involvement in management and enforcement.
(Acheson and Brewer, 2000). Because of these changes,
many lobstermen we interviewed supported using
apprenticeship to standardize expectations for teaching
ethics and standard practices.

All of this assumes that acquisition of knowledge and
skills can change behavior. In fact, apprenticeship should
help align individual rationality with the common good.
It does so by changing the “bounds” of fishermen’s
rationality – the frame of reference of information and
values which informs their ecological economic, and
negotiation decisions. While altering the bounds of
rationality alters subsequent actions, the nature of these
changes is not entirely predictable. In this regard
apprenticeship is an act of trust/faith. Like comanagement, there is little conclusive proof of its
effectiveness/benefits. Until such evidence is available,
apprenticeship is initiated in the spirit of Horace Mann of
Massachusetts (1846), who said, "The property of this
Commonwealth is pledged for the education of all its
youth, up to such a point as will … prepare them for the
adequate performance of their social and civil duties."
6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Non-fishing information is something not normally
provided to or required of fishermen. Basic biological
and ecological information about the fishery they pursue
and the ecology of the area in which they fish (as opposed
to stock assessment models) provide the baseline
understanding of the system they use. It is surprising that,
while managers and the general public often decry
fishermen's irresponsibility and, sometimes, ignorance,
fishermen are not required to acquire this basic
information. In most fisheries, there is virtually no nonregulatory forum in which managers, scientists, and
fishermen can talk about the life cycle of commercially
fished species. Simple information such as the fact that
most commercial species have a pelagic life stage can be
a revelation to a fisherman who has never been exposed to
marine science.

It is not in the scope of this paper to provide a discussion
of implementation recommendations. Certain comments,
however, are appropriate.
Nothing has been said above about costs of
apprenticeship. While the costs of developing and
maintaining curriculum are appropriate public sector
investments, in certain circumstances they could also be
shared with industry if the program is developed
collaboratively.
Cost sharing with apprentices is
appropriate to cover administrative and maintenance
costs.
The requirements of an apprenticeship should provide
both fishing experience and non-fishing information.
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Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V., and Bishop, Richard C., 'Common
property' as a concept in natural resources policy, Natural
Resources Journal, 15, 713-727, 1975.

Design of an apprentice curriculum should draw on other
apprentice programs and should keep in mind the explicit
public purposes of the program. Apprenticeship programs
should be designed and maintained in a collaborative
process with industry and managers.
Technology
provides a number of options for delivery of the
educational portion of a curriculum in innovative ways.

Conlisk, John, Why bounded rationality?, Journal of
Economic Literature, 34, 669-700, 1996.
Copes, Parzival, A critical review of individual quotas as
a device in fisheries management, Land Economics,
62(3), 278-291, 1986.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Dietz, Thomas, and Paul C. Stern, Science, values, and
biodiversity, Bioscience, 48(6), 441-444, 1998.

Apprenticeship should be considered as a management
tool that restricts rate of entry, affects the quality of the
participants, and creates conditions for collective action
for sustainability.
It is particularly important for
decentralized adaptive management systems that require
ongoing negotiation or analytic deliberation with many
parties.
8.
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failures: a millennium of common mountain pastures in
Iceland, in The Political Economy of Customs and
Culture: Informal Solutions to the Commons Problem ed.
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Rowman, 1993.
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